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Summary
When modelling data generated from a discrete choice contingent valuation
question, the treatment of zero bids affects the welfare estimates.  Zero bids
may come from respondents who are not interested in the provision of the
public good; alternatively, some zero-bidders may be protesting about the
valuation exercise, but hold positive values for the good. In this paper we
investigate the effect of different levels of information on zero-bidders on
welfare estimates for the population. We find that different strategies of
identification may have non-trivial effects. We recommend use of full
debriefing questions for zero-bidders, and use of sample selection models to
correct for bias caused by protest behaviour.
2Non Technical Summary
The contingent valuation method consists in eliciting the reservation price of
sampled individuals for some change in the provision of a public good. If
negative bids are ruled out, a combination of zero and positive values is
elicited. Any members of the population with strictly increasing preferences for
the good may be assumed to have positive reservation prices, while those that
are indifferent to the good may be assumed to hold zero values.
Unfortunately, it may turn out that some zero bids may be motivated by protest
behaviour, and do not convey correct information on the respondents’
preferences. It is crucial that the questionnaire contains elements that helps to
discriminate between individuals that are not interested in the public good, and
protesters. Individuals belonging to the second group hold positive values, that
may, or may not, be distributed as those of non zero-bidders. In fact, the
presence of protest responses may introduce a selectivity bias in the estimation
process, and produce biased estimates of welfare benefits.  A sample selection
model is therefore required to correct for selection bias generated by these
responses.
This paper explores the effects of information on zero-bidders on the estimates
of the WTP function, and the resulting welfare measures. Protest responses are
modelled by means of a sample selection model, so that selectivity bias can be
corrected.  It is shown that different levels of information on the nature of the
zero-bidders may have significant effects on the welfare estimates.  It is
therefore recommended that the questionnaire contains full debriefing
questions for a correct identification of zero values and protest responses.
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Sample Selection Model, Survey Design.
JEL: C35, C51, C81, D60, H41, Q26.
May 2000
31. Introduction
Individual preferences for public goods may be assessed using
contingent valuation (CV) methods.  These techniques are
commonly used to investigate public willingness to pay (WTP) for
a proposed change in public good provision.  If the additional
provision of the public good has a non-negative impact on the
welfare of any households, i.e. no part of the population is made
worse off by the proposed change, it can be assumed that WTP
for the proposed change is non-negative.  In particular, any
members of the population with strictly increasing preferences for
the good may be assumed to have positive WTP, while those that
are indifferent to the good may be assumed to have zero WTP for
the increase in provision.
In fact, when negative WTP is ruled out, CV surveys typically
elicit a combination of zero and non-zero bids across a sample
population.  Unfortunately, while some zero bids are a true
reflection of preferences, others may be motivated by protest
behaviour.  Respondents may react to some component of the
survey design on conceptual rather than economic grounds, and as
a result signal a refusal to pay for the hypothetical change in
provision.  The presence of protest responses in the estimation
process may produce biased estimates of welfare benefits.
In discrete choice (DC) CV studies respondents are asked
whether or not they would be willing to pay a specified sum for a
proposed change in the provision of the good. In such studies ad
hoc debriefing questions may be used to distinguish between the
different underlying motives for a "No" response.  In a well-
designed debriefing session the prevalence of one motive or
another may be inferred by examining respondents’ reasons for
being unwilling to pay a given amount.  For example, some
respondents who refuse to pay any amount may be voicing an
objection to increased taxation, to the current expenditure policy,
or merely disbelief in the realism of the proposed change in
provision.  All of these reasons may give rise to protest responses.
This paper explores the effects of information on protest
4behaviour on the estimates of the WTP function, and the resulting
welfare measures.  In this case, the public good under
investigation is the implementation of a traffic calming scheme
that effectively reduces the speed of the vehicles in built up areas
to 30 miles per hour.  Effective speed reduction is deemed to be
achieved when 85 percent of drivers comply with the speed limit
(though by definition 15 percent of drivers still exceed it). The
sample population for the study were the residents of three small
towns in the North East of England, all of whom suffer from
negative externalities associated with high volume through traffic.
In this context we find that the treatment of the information
recorded on the motivation for zero bids has significant effects on
the welfare estimates.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  The next
section presents the theoretical background for this research and
in section three the methodology adopted for the study is
outlined. In section four the results of the analysis are discussed,
while the final section summarises these findings and concludes
the paper.
2. Theory
In the DC CV framework, individuals are questioned whether
or not they would be willing to pay a specified sum for a proposed
change in the provision of some public good. The method is used
in two variants: the single bound, if only one price is proposed to
each individual; and the double bound, where a second bid is offered,
higher than the first if the answer was positive, and lower
otherwise.
The scenario is similar to a standard market situation, where
individuals face given prices, and decide to accept or refuse the
transaction, depending on their own reservation price. In general,
if the proposed hypothetical transaction underlying the DC CV
question is accepted by the respondent, then it can be assumed
that she is in the market for the good, i.e. is interested in the
provision of the public good. Hence, a positive answer given to
5the valuation question can be treated as informative regarding the
respondent’s preference for the public good. If instead the answer
is negative, or, when the double bound elicitation format is used,
both answers to the bid questions are negative, the resulting
information is more blurry, and can be interpreted in different
ways.
A first possibility is that the respondent is interested in the
public good, but holds a reservation price lower than the lower
offered bid: if an appropriately low bid were offered, the
transaction would have been accepted. Another possibility is that
the respondent is not interested in the provision of the public
good: in this case, the transaction would be rejected for all positive
bids. However, the converse is not necessarily true: it is possible
that the respondent rejects the transaction as a protest against
some of the features of the hypothetical transaction depicted in
the CV scenario.
In terms of individual WTP, the following three cases can be
identified:
¨ some people may provide this response because their valuation
of the programme is truly between zero and the lowest of the
two proposed bid-amounts;
¨ others may have a zero valuation for the proposed policy
because they are truly not in the market for the good, and
therefore indifferent to the proposed change;
¨ finally, another group may be reacting to some elements of the
CV exercise and not conveying a response motivated by
economically rational preferences, but instead by a desire to
protest against the proposed hypothetical transaction1.  Such
respondents may be in the market for the good, and their
differential treatment in the estimation of the valuation
function is investigated below.
                                         
1 While one may argue that in a well-constructed CV study these should be
minimised, this problem may be of difficult resolution in the phase of survey
design.
6In the recent practice, contingent valuation surveys usually
contain information that help to distinguish the first case from the
latter two, but often no further investigation on the zero-bidders.
It is the purpose of this study to show that analysis may be
hampered if no other information is collected about the
motivations behind the rejection of the proposed transaction.
Since additional questions make the interview more
cumbersome, it is important to adopt a low-cost and effective
identification procedure. In the present study -characterised by a
double bound elicitation format- debriefing questions were
administered to individuals who rejected both the proposed bid-
amounts: i.e. "No-No" respondents.
The following possibilities are explored:
a) No further information is collected after receiving a No-
No response to the WTP question;
b) A question is introduced after receiving a No-No response
to the WTP question, aimed at discriminating between
zero bids and positive WTP;
c) A further question is prompted to zero bidders, aimed at
discriminating between zero values and protest responses.
These schemes give rise to different specifications of the
decision model.  This study investigates how sensitive welfare
measures are to these alternative designs. The methodology is
described in the next section.
3. Methodology
In the following it is assumed that the elicitation method does
not produce any anchoring effect, or other possible bias: i.e., once
an individual decides to signal his or her reservation price, the
answers to the bid questions are expression of the true WTP.
Also, the possibility of negative WTP is excluded: at worst,
individuals are indifferent to the public good, holding zero values,
but are not negatively affected by its provision.
This section is structured in two parts: the first part deals
with the general specification of the decision models, that is
7dependent on the informative structure of the data defined by the
three designs described above. The second part presents the
particular specifications for the choice functions that have been
adopted in our application.
3.1 Decision models
Design a) The setting in which no further information is
collected to discriminate between zero-bidders and No-No
responses can be analysed by means of a conventional double
bound DC-CV, applied to the whole set of observations. This set
up carries the implicit assumption that all individuals hold a
positive WTP for the provision of the good. In this context,
individual’s choice can be seen as a one stage decision process.
Assuming that each individual knows his or her reservation price
for the public good, he or she compares this value to the
proposed bids, and gives a positive or negative answer according
to the following scheme:
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where Yi is the answer to the first or second question, ti is the first
or second bid, and W* is the (latent) individual’s WTP. An
individual accepts the payment of the amount t if her WTP is
greater than the proposed bid, and refuses to pay the amount t
otherwise. This model is implemented through the following log-
likelihood function:
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where t indicates the first bid amount while tu and tl indicate
the upper and lower follow-up bids respectively; H is a cumulative
univariate distribution function, having as arguments the matrix  q
of parameters and regressors, and the vector of the bids.
Design b) When the DC-CV design conveys information that
identifies zero-bidders, but no further information is available to
distinguish between protest responses and true zero values, zero
bids will be treated as a homogeneous set.  Two alternative
strategies are available: either considering all zero bids as protest
responses, or considering all of them as zero values.
In the first case, it is implicitly assumed that all individuals hold
a positive WTP for the good. The decision process can be
modelled as a two-stage sequence: first, the individual chooses
whether or not to signal his true reservation price; if yes, he
decides to accept or refuse the proposed bid.  When the double-
bound procedure is employed, the process may be represented as
a sequence of three choices that can be represented by three
dummy variables I, W1 and W2, and two latent variables, *
1I  and
*W :
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The first dummy variable I indicates whether or not an
individual is in or out of the market, depending upon some latent
9variable I*, representing willingness to enter the market and
depending upon some specified socio-economic covariates.  The
dummy variable W1 indicates whether or not the individual
accepts or refuses the first proposed bid, and analogously W2 for
the second bid. But W is observed only if I=1: the observed
outcomes of W are conditioned on I=1, i.e. on the individual
choosing to be in the market.
The generic likelihood for the sample observations is:
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where the first term applies to the zero bidders (I=0), and the
second term is decomposed into four intervals for individuals:
accepting both bids; accepting the first bid but not the second;
refusing the first bid and accepting the second; and finally refusing
both of bids.
Now define by H(x,q) the cumulative distribution function
evaluated at the implicit valuation function; N is the number of
respondents, either in or out of the market; ZB is the number of
zero-bidders.
The log-likelihood sample-selection model is specified as
follows (see Calia and Strazzera,1999):
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where t indicates the first bid amount while tu and tl indicate the
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upper and lower follow-up bids respectively; Hz is a cumulative
univariate distribution function for the zero bidders, functionally
dependent on a matrix of parameters and regressors qz; H2 is a
cumulative bivariate distribution function for those individuals in
the market, having as arguments qz, another matrix q of possibly
different parameters and regressors, the vector of the bids, and
the correlation coefficient r.
The estimate obtained from the sample selection model is
different from what would be obtained from the sub-sample of
observed responses of Y2, because the latter is affected by a bias
term, which has the same sign as r, and is null only if r is zero
(further details are given in section 3.2). In fact, use of the
truncated sample to estimate WTP is quite common among CV
practitioners. It is worth stressing that this strategy is equivalent to
assuming that the probability of obtaining a zero-bid response
from individuals with specific socioeconomic characteristics is
independent of the value they give to the good. In other terms,
zero-bidders are assumed to be protesters, and the two choices
(protest or not) are assumed to be independent among sample
observations.
If zero bids are interpreted as zero values, it is assumed that
zero bidders represent a part of the population that is not
interested in the provision of the public good.  When attempting
to estimate the benefits arising from the provision of local public
goods, it is necessary to establish the fraction of the population
that is in the market for such a good, and to estimate the relevant
parameters of the valuation function.  Assuming that the entire
population is in the market for the good may result in a significant
bias in the estimated benefits.  Recent developments in estimation
methods for public good valuation by means of DC-CV try to
address this problem by means of models with a positive mass at
zero, the so-called "spike" models.
Kriström (1997), Ayala and An (1996), Scarpa et al. (1999),
among others, approach this issue. In these studies the probability
of being in the market is estimated without placing any conditions
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on covariates.  Alternatively, McFadden (1994), and Reiser and
Shechter (1998) introduce covariate effects on the probability of
zero WTP.  The present work does not address the problem of
the treatment of zero values, which will be the object of a further
stage of the research. Here, full information on zero values will
serve only for the purpose to identify the two groups of protesters
and non protesters: zero values in this case will be included in the
sample of non protest responses, and the exact information on
the amount (zero) will be ignored, by including them in the No-
No set of responses.
Design c) Zero bidders may be requested to explain the
reasons of their response, and this information helps to classify
them either as protesters, or instead as being indifferent to the
provision of the good (since negative WTP is ruled out). The
statistical treatment of the data set produced by this setting is
similar to that of case b), with a sample selection model that
selects between protesters (that are now correctly identified) and
non protesters (that include both individuals with positive and
zero WTP). It is worth to recall that proper treatment of zero
values would require a spike to be included in the sample selection
model, but this path of research is not pursued at this stage.
3.2 Specification of the choice functions
The choice of specification of the underlying valuation
function can now be considered in more detail.  The dependent
variable can be modelled either as a dichotomous variable, as in
the random utility model (RUM) framework; or as a censored
variable, which is the approach proposed by Cameron and James
(1987) and Cameron (1988).  For the computation of the relevant
central tendency measures, the RUM approach requires the use of
complex integration procedures, while the censored variable
approach produces a direct conditional estimate of the reservation
prices and of the relevant central tendency measures. Confidence
intervals for these measures can be easily computed according to
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the analytical formula suggested by Cameron (1991). The latter
approach was therefore chosen for this application.
It is hypothesised that the amount that each individual is willing
to pay for the resource is functionally related to the individual’s
socio-economic characteristics, according to the following non-
linear function:
)exp()exp(* iii uxW b¢= , (6)
where xi  is the vector of regressors, and ui is a random term,
that is assumed to be log-normally distributed, such that its
logarithm ui is normally distributed with zero mean and variance
s2.  This functional form can be linearised by taking the logarithm:
iii uxW +¢= b*ln . (7)
The central tendency measures for the WTP|x;b latent variable
can be computed at their mean values: if the error term has zero
mean, then:
bb ˆ)ˆ()(ln * iii xxEWE ¢=¢= , (8)
Therefore if the variables are continuous, the estimated
coefficients are applied to the regressors taken at their mean
values: if the regressors are dummy variables then they taken at
each of the alternative values. Using the properties of the log-
normal distribution and taking anti-logs, the median of the WTP
latent variable is obtained; to calculate its mean, the estimate
should be multiplied by )2exp(
2s  (see Greene, 1991, p.168).
Analytical computation of confidence intervals around the
median is straightforward, since it is sufficient to apply the
formula proposed by Cameron (1991):
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where V is the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients.
Computation of confidence intervals around the mean would be
less precise, and the median should be preferred to the mean as a
measure of central tendency.
When the discrete choice elicitation method is employed, the
variable *iW  cannot be directly observed: it is only observed if the
latent variable is above or under some level ti, that is the amount
proposed to each individual.  The latent variable *iW  can be
interpreted as a censored variable, the level of censoring being the
amount ti.
The statistical model is the following:
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Given the above specification for the distribution of the error
term, under the double-bound format the following log-likelihood
function is obtained:
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This is the model that is adopted for the in-the-market
component of the sample estimates. It can be observed that the
variable censoring level allows separate estimation of the
parameters s and b, so that the variance-covariance matrix of the
estimated coefficients can be used to calculate the confidence
intervals around the central tendency measure of interest.
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If there is no a priori reason to assume that the two structural
equations, the selection equation and the valuation equation, are
independent, then the sample selection model should be used.
Let x1 and x2 be two vectors of socio-economic characteristics
of individuals (not necessarily distinct), and assume the following
specification for the two models:
111* uxI +¢= b (12)
222222 *ln)exp()exp(* uxWuxW +¢=Þ¢= bb (13)
where u1 and u2 are two error terms with joint c.d.f. ),( 21 uuF . It
is assumed that ),( 21 uu  have bivariate normal distributions with
mean zero and covariance matrix:
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the variance of I* is set to 1 for normalisation while the variance
of ln W* can be estimated since the bids are varied among
individuals.
The log-likelihood of the resulting sample selection model is
then specified as follows:
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Estimates of the parameters rsbb ,,, 221  can be obtained
simultaneously, by maximising the log-likelihood function with
respect to all arguments.  However, in practice, it has often been
noticed that the likelihood function in sample-selection models
can behave in an irregular manner (see Copas, 1990; Nawata and
Nagase, 1996).  Because the likelihood function is well-behaved
for fixed values of r, it is suggested that the likelihood profile
)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ|( 221 sbbrl  should be evaluated for a grid of values of r in
the interval (-1,+1) and an approximate confidence interval
calculated for r as [ 21,1)(2)ˆ(2: acrrr -£- ll ] around the
maximum )ˆ(rl . If the interval contains zero then the null
hypothesis that there is no selection bias is accepted.
The estimate obtained from the truncated sample of observed
responses of Y2 is the following:
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individuals, the sign depending on the sign of r: if 0<r  we
would under-estimate the mean wtp while if 0>r  we would over-
estimate the mean wtp. Only if 0=r , the two choices are
independent among sample observations, and unbiased estimates
of the parameters could be obtained by fitting two separate
equations for I and W.
4. Survey and Data
The households sampled for the survey were drawn from the
residential telephone listings of three villages in the North East of
England.  These were (1) Haydon Bridge on the A69 west of
Hexham; (2) Rowlands Gill on the A694 near Gateshead; and (3)
Seaton Sluice on the A193 between Whitley Bay and Blyth.
Although each village is somewhat different in terms of layout and
location, all three are crossed by busy trunk roads with sustained
through traffic travelling at high speeds.  Actual speeds were
measured on site and detected to be below the 85 percent
compliance threshold, which had been deemed to be the
definition of effective speed limit enforcement.  The measured
85th percentiles were 42 mph in Seaton Sluice, 40 mph in
Rowlands Gill and 35 mph in Haydon Bridge.
One focus group was conducted in each of the three villages to
inform survey design and aid understanding of households’
perceptions of traffic-related externalities.  During these
preliminary studies, focus group participants unequivocally
identified speed as a major concern for them and for other
residents.  With respect to the other negative externalities from
traffic, noise, air pollution, and community severance were also
mentioned and some of these are studied more in depth elsewhere
(see Garrod et al. 2000).
Interviews with respondents were conducted by telephone
between March and May 1999.  Since interviews were aimed at
investigating WTP at the household level, calls were made at times
when the head of the household was likely to be found at home,
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i.e. mainly after 5.30pm.  The payment vehicle used in the
hypothetical scenario was a yearly increase in council tax for the
duration of a traffic-calming scheme ensuring effective speed
reduction.  As a consequence, whenever possible, the interviewers
tried to administer the survey to the family member in charge of
these payments.  About a quarter of the sample declined to be
interviewed.  This non-response rate was of similar magnitude to
that recorded in other telephone surveys.
The focus groups enabled the proposed wording of the
questionnaire to be tested and helped to determine the attitudes of
local people to traffic and speed reduction.  The focus groups
were also used in the identification of the initial bid vector. In the
hope of obtaining a more efficient bid-design under the
maintained hypothesis of log-normality of the WTP distribution,
the bid vector was updated after the first 300 responses had been
collected.  Since both parametric and non-parametric2 estimation
was intended, and these imply different prescriptions for
efficiency in bid-design, the bid up-date had to accommodate the
needs of both.
Parametric estimation makes little use of bid amounts placed
away from mean WTP, such as those in the tails, while non-
parametric estimation requires a good investigation of the
behaviour along the whole bid range.  As a compromise, the
survey proceeded by increasing the number of probes on the
percentiles around the estimated mean and by reducing those at
intermediate ones, while maintaining some probes at the extreme
percentiles.
                                         
2 See Scarpa et al. (1999) for a non-parametric analysis of the CV responses.
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Table 1: Sample Means of Regressors
Variables Full
sample
In the
Market
Out of the
Market
Protesters Indifferent
Driving 0.762 0.758 0.768 0.772 0.763
Children 0.221 0.275 0.132 0.146 0.113
Walk to School 0.115 0.128 0.095 0.122 0.062
Wages* 1.185 1.230 1.111 1.122 1.098
Disability 0.172 0.175 0.168 0.138 0.206
Participation 0.278 0.294 0.250 0.236 0.268
Haydon Bridge 0.326 0.297 0.373 0.333 0.423
Rowlands Gill 0.367 0.397 0.318 0.276 0.371
n. observations 580 360 220 123 97
* Wages is the only continuous variable, ranging in the interval
[0,5].
The questionnaire is presented as an appendix to this paper. A
selection of sample statistics relevant for this study is presented in
Table 1.
5. Estimation Strategy and Results
As discussed in an earlier section, this study aims at assessing
the effects on the estimation of welfare benefits of the following
three levels of information on zero-bidders:
a) No further information is collected after receiving a No-
No response to the WTP question;
b) A question is introduced after receiving a No-No response
to the WTP question, aimed at discriminating between
zero bids and positive WTP;
c) A further question is prompted to zero bidders, aimed at
discriminating between zero values and protest responses.
Design a) The first strategy gives rise to the conventional
double-bounded interval data model.  Additional information on
the nature of the zero-bid is not used, and all No-No responses
are modelled as true non-negative WTP values below the lowest
bid. The parameter estimates of Model 1 are obtained by applying
eq. 12, and selecting between different nested specifications by
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means of a Likelihood Ratio test. The selected model is presented
in Table 2.  The relative median WTP estimates, on various sets of
conditioning values, are reported in Table 3. From Table 3 it can
be seen that the effect of having children under 13 years of age is
twice as strong as being willing to participate in further surveys on
this topic, or as being resident in Rowlands Gill, the most affluent
of the three villages.
Table 2: Model 1. Parameter Estimates for Full Sample
Model
Parameters Full sample
N=580 Estimates St. Error p-value
Constant 1.751 0.144 0.000
Children 1.046 0.220 0.000
Participation 0.395 0.203 0.026
Rowlands Gill 0.419 0.187 0.013
s 1.786 0.107 0.000
l -776.046
Table 3: Model 1: Median WTP and Confidence Intervals
Model Median WTP 95% C.I. for Median
WTP
Reduced(a) 5.760 [4.342, 7.641]
Children(b) 16.400 [10.709, 25.115]
Participation(c) 8.549 [6.019, 12.156]
Rowlands Gill(d) 8.756 [6.478, 11.836]
(a) all dummy values are zero (reduced model): this is also the modal
character;
(b) dummy for children =1, others zero;
(c) dummy for participation =1, others zero;
(d) dummy for RG =1, others zero.
Further combinations (i.e. children+RG, etc.) would be redundant,
since their frequency in the sample is negligible.
Design b) The second strategy is implemented by means of a
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sample selection model: the relative specification is Model 2 in
Table 4, for the value r = -0.93 that maximises the likelihood.
Notice that the set of significant covariates for the valuation
function are now different from those which were significant in
Model 1.  In particular, WTP increases with the number of wage
earners in the household and is higher for drivers.  The selection
equation shows that people with children below the age of 13 are
more likely to reveal that they are in the market for effective speed
reduction.
Table 4: Model 2 - Parameter Estimates for Sample Selection
Model
Parameters Sample Selection
Estimates St. Error p-value
Selection eq: N=580.
Constant 0.223 0.070 0.000
Children 0.717 0.164 0.000
Walk to School -0.328 0.207 0.056
Participation 0.140 0.102 0.085
Haydon Bridge -0.223 0.010 0.011
Wtp eq.: N=360
Constant 3.457 0.137 0.000
Driving 0.237 0.146 0.052
Wages 0.212 0.073 0.002
s 1.322 0.082 0.000
r -0.93
l -885.776
On the other hand, residents of Haydon Bridge and,
surprisingly, those households with children who walk to school,
both have a negative impact on the selection equation, i.e. are
more likely to be protesters.  The negative effect of the variable
“walk to school” may be logical if this means that those children
are not affected by traffic (e.g. they take other routes to school,
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away from the main road): this may reduce the incentive for these
parents to signal their interest in effective speed reduction.
The assumption of no correlation between the two equations is
nested in the sample selection model, for r = 0, and can be tested
by means of a Likelihood Ratio test. For r in the range [-1,+1],
the test is: ]),(2)ˆ,ˆ(2:[ 21,1 acqrqrr -£- ll , where the hat
denotes parameters evaluated at the maximum. The results of the
test are omitted for brevity: it suffices to report that the L-ratio
for r=0 is 24.66, so that the hypothesis of no correlation is
strongly rejected (p<0.0001).
To show the effect of an incorrect assumption of zero
correlation between the two equations, the following tables report
the estimates obtained when incurring this type of
misspecification.
Table 5. Model 3: Parameter Estimates for Truncated Sample
Model
Parameters Truncated sample
n=360 Estimates S. Error p-value
Constant 2.697 0.141 0.000
Driving 0.286 0.165 0.041
Wages 0.219 0.080 0.003
s 1.095 0.064 0.000
l -520.380
Model 3 is estimated using the double-bound approach only on
those respondents who are in the market and neglecting any
selection effect.  In this case the log-valuation function shows a
markedly smaller constant effect, with a stronger marginal effect
for drivers and one of similar magnitude for the number of wages.
Median WTP estimates are reported in Table 7 for both Models 2
and 3.  As one can see the choice of specification matters.  In
particular the adoption of a sample-selection model produces a
median estimate twice as big for each set of values of the
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covariates.
Table 6. Models 2 and 3: Median WTP and Confidence
Intervals
Model Median
WTP
95% C.I. for Median WTP
Sample Selection
No Driving 40.770 [31.167, 53.330]
Driving 51.681 [42.168, 63.340]
Truncated sample
No Driving 19.222 [14.624, 25.265]
Driving 25.591 [21.582, 30.344]
It is quite clear that lack of information on the nature of the
zero bids produces dramatically different estimates of the central
tendency measure for the WTP, ranging from £ 5.7 of model 1
(using the modal characterisation) to £ 51.7 of model 2 (again, in
the modal characterisation). To assess the bias due to the
misspecification of the model, we compare the previous results
with the estimates obtained when protesters are correctly
identified.
Design c) The fourth model (see Table 8) is estimated using
this information.  Now having a disability shows a significant
positive effect in the probability of being in the market, while the
effects of the dummy for children under 13 and of participation
are in the same direction, but of a much stronger magnitude.  In
the valuation function the set of structural parameters with
significance also changes, as driving is no longer significant.  Note
that the constant effect also diminishes in this model, while the
effect of wages increases.
23
Table 7. Model 4 - Parameter Estimates for the Sample
Selection Model
Parameters Sample Selection
Estimates St. Error p-value
Selection eq. N=580
Constant 0.657 0.066 0.000
Children 0.785 0.201 0.000
Walk to School -0.581 0.234 0.006
Disability 0.160 0.136 0.119
Wtp eq. N =457
Constant 2.971 0.130 0.000
Wages 0.254 0.083 0.001
s 1.857 0.110 0.000
r -0.98
l -959.720
Table 8. Model 5 - Parameter Estimates for Truncated
Sample Model
Parameters Truncated sample
n=457
Constant 2.444 0.136 0.000
Wages 0.242 0.09 0.004
s 1.566 0.094 0.000
l -678.590
Model 5 (see Table 8) is nested within in Sample Selection
Model 4: also in this case the hypothesis r=0 is rejected by the
Likelihood Ratio test, with value 12.50 (p<0.001). The values for
the median and the corresponding confidence interval for both
models are reported in Table 9.
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Table 9. Median WTP and Confidence Intervals
Model Median WTP 95% C.I. for Median
WTP
Sample Selection 26.373 [21.846, 31.839]
Truncated Sample 15.352 [12.975, 18.164]
It is apparent that a lack of information about the nature of the
zero bidders can strongly affect the estimates of the benefits, as
can be observed by comparing median WTP estimates obtained
by Model 1 and Model 2, and the corresponding estimates
obtained by Model 4 (see Tables 3, 6 and 9). Incidentally, it can be
observed that the modal characterisation of Model 3 produces a
WTP estimate close to that of Model 4, and that this specification
was rejected when compared to Model 2.
6. Conclusions
Discrete choice CV surveys are often used to estimate social
benefits from public goods for which no conventional market
exists. Given the hypothetical nature of contingent markets, the
identification of the section of the population outside the market
is imperfect, and in the absence of adequate debriefing questions it
is difficult to separate true zero values from protest responses.
This paper utilises data from a DC-CV study with a follow-up
question aimed at estimating the benefits from a local public good.
The good in question was a reduction in effective speed limits in
three villages experiencing heavy through traffic. This reduction in
speed would be achieved through traffic calming measures.  In
this study ad-hoc debriefing questions were used to probe the
motivation behind "No-No" responses, so that each response
could be classified either as positive WTP, or as a zero value, or as
a protest response. This allows us to investigate the effects of
three information structures on the estimates of welfare benefits.
First, it is assumed that no information is collected after receiving
a No-No response to the WTP question; then, information is
added to discriminate between zero bids and positive WTP;
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finally, further information is allowed to identify zero bids as zero
values or protest responses.
In the latter two cases, the valuation function is estimated
through a sample selection model. In both selectivity models the
hypothesis of zero correlation between the selection and the
valuation equation is rejected. This result should warn contingent
valuation practitioners always to test the selectivity hypothesis: the
double bound model on the truncated sample of people in-the-
market is often applied without an appropriate testing of the
hypothesis of zero correlation between the two equations.
The present study has shown that different strategies of
identification for the sample fraction out-of-the-market may have
non-trivial effects on welfare estimates. Use of full debriefing
questions for zero-bidders is therefore recommended.  Further
research should be conducted to investigate the sensitivity of the
WTP estimates to specific choices of model specification.  This
could be done by means of adequately framed Monte Carlo
experiments.
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Appendix
Traffic regulations impose speed limits that are not always
enforced successfully. In (NAME OF THE VILLAGE) our
researchers have found out that 85% of the vehicles driving
through the village on the main road (that’s eight or nine vehicles
in every ten) travel at a speed of  (SPEED MEASURED AT THE
VILLAGE) mph or slower, compared with the speed limit of 30
mph.
Now, suppose that the council were considering introducing a
traffic calming scheme in your village. It is certain that this scheme
will reduce the speed of traffic through the main road so that 85%
of vehicles would be driving through the village at a speed of 30
mph or slower.
Unfortunately, the cost of this scheme is not covered by the
local council budget. The only way to implement the speed
reduction scheme in (NAME OF THE VILLAGE) is if each
household resident in (NAME OF THE VILLAGE) pays an
additional fee to the council for this new safety scheme. This fee
would be on top of the normal council tax.
We are now going to mention some money amounts, these can
sound ridiculously high or low to you, please do not take these
proposed amounts as an indication of value, because there are not.
We are just interested in your honest answer.
Suppose, that the council wants to know the residents' opinion
about this public programme and in order to do so it asks
residents to vote for or against the realisation of such a scheme in
a local referendum.
This programme will cost your household additional yearly
fees. Please, before answering, consider that there are other things
you can buy with this money. Would you vote in favour of the
scheme if it would cost you £(bid 1) every year in additional fees.?
(if you are not paying local taxes because you are a pensioner, this
fee would still apply to your household).
Yes No
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If yes
Suppose now that the programme will cost your household £
(bid2) every year in additional local fees. Would you still vote in
favour of the programme?
If No
Suppose now that the scheme will personally cost your household
£(bid2) every year in additional local fees. Would you vote in
favour of the programme at this lower amount?
If two Nos.
Would you be WTP any amount of money at all for such a
speed reduction programme through additional local fees?
Yes No
If No again.
With which of the two following statements would you most
agree with?
a) "The reduction of traffic speed is of no value to my
household and I am therefore willing to pay nothing for the
proposed traffic calming scheme".
b) "I actively oppose the realisation of traffic calming schemes
and my household is willing to pay not to have it implemented in my
village."
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